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For decades, the Japanese government has maintained that Japan has the right 
of collective self-defense under international law, but that the nation’s consti-
tution does not allow it to exercise that right. Now, Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe wants to expand Japan’s defense options and in the process reinterpret the 
constitution. Many policymakers and analysts in the United States agree with 
Abe’s intended course of action, and have noted that constitutional reinter-
pretation to permit the right of collective self-defense could allow Japan’s Self 
Defense Forces (SDF) to better integrate into U.S.-Japan alliance activities and 
to be more active in international peacekeeping efforts. However, less attention 
is paid to domestic debates. In Japan collective self-defense is still an extremely 
sensitive issue among the public. It has put strain on the government and may 
ultimately invite closer judicial review of security related legislation. More cir-
cumspection as well as a different approach to constitutional change is in order.
STACKING THE DECK 
Much of the controversy surrounding reinterpretation stems from Abe’s 
governing style. The prime minister has upset convention within Japan’s 
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highly regularized bureaucracy, appointing to committees and offices those 
who agree with his politics. In terms of constitutional reinterpretation, his 
most prominent selection is career diplomat Ichiro Komatsu to head the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), which scrutinizes legislation and gov-
ernment policy to ensure that it is in line with the constitution. The CLB 
director-general is usually selected from the bureau’s own ranks and, until 
now, never from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Komatsu has publically 
disagreed with the CLB’s consistent position that exercising the right of 
collective self-defense would violate Article 9. Indeed, rather than offering 
independent advice, Komatsu has explained that as “part of the Cabinet,” 
the CLB must “do what it can to follow the prime minister’s policy.”1 His 
irregular appointment has therefore been criticized in Japan as a “rude tech-
nique” to accelerate Abe’s reinterpretation agenda.2 
This is not, however, the first time Abe has been accused of placing his 
own supporters in areas where they could shape the debate on reinterpreta-
tion. In 2007, when he was briefly prime minister the first time, Abe con-
vened a commission of 13 experts to explore whether the government could 
reinterpret the constitution to better provide for Japan’s security. The com-
mission was criticized heavily in the Japanese media as assembled simply to 
agree with the prime minister’s position. Indeed, it was well known that its 
members favored reinterpretation, and its composition—the commission 
included only one expert on the constitution, and an extremely conservative 
one at that—does suggest its members were selected more for these prefer-
ences than for expertise with constitutional issues.3 
The commission’s findings emphasized the practical benefits of collective 
self-defense in four hypothetical cases, but were ignored by subsequent gov-
ernments, for good reason. Their legal argument relied mostly on a formula 
stating that Japan should be permitted to engage in collective self-defense 
because it has the right to do so under international law.4 The Charter of 
the United Nations does indeed allow every member nation the rights of 
individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack by an aggres-
sor. However, the commission’s argument was deeply flawed. Nations can 
always waive their rights, and in the case of collective self-defense, the lan-
guage and long-standing interpretations of Article 9 of the constitution 
compel Japan to do so.
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 Back in power from 2012, Abe reconvened the commission with essen-
tially the same membership to again deal with the question of reinterpreta-
tion. In February 2014, it released its preliminary report to the cabinet just 
in time for Abe to state that he did not consider amendment of the con-
stitution necessary to allow collective self-defense. Abe wants to introduce 
the new interpretation before the end of the Diet session in June. Under 
this timetable, the Diet would have at most about two months to consider 
the historic change after the commission’s final report is delivered in April. 
However, Abe has noted that he might sidestep Diet debate altogether and 
simply have the Cabinet declare the reinterpretation as government policy. 
SELF DEFENSE AND THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION— 
THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION
The commission thus has a difficult task—to explain why CLB interpreta-
tions almost as old as the constitution itself should now be considered in-
correct. In 1954, following some earlier discussion on the matter, the CLB 
settled on the interpretation that the first paragraph of Article 9, which 
renounces war “and the threat or use of force as a means of settling inter-
national disputes,” did not “deny the right of self-defense […] in the case of 
an immediate violation of the nation of Japan.” 5 A clear attack on Japan’s 
undisputed sovereign territory could not be an international dispute from 
Japan’s point of view. Moreover, the language in the second paragraph con-
nected a ban on “air, sea, and land forces and other war potential” to the 
first. The ban did not therefore cover the acquisition of military-style weap-
ons for uses short of war, such as maintaining public order. Nor did it pre-
clude these arms from being used for defense of the nation against a direct 
attack.6 Individual self-defense was thus permitted under the constitution. 
According to the CLB, however, the constitution clearly imposed re-
strictions on Japan when defending itself.7 By the time it had settled on 
its interpretation allowing individual self-defense, the government had 
refined those restrictions into three inseparable principles based on the 
CLB’s reading of Article 9.8 These principles continue to form the basis of 
Japan’s position regarding the use of force against other nations, appearing 
46
Abe’s Law: Domestic Dimensions of Japan’s Collective Self-Defense Debate
as a  comprehensive statement in Japan’s annual defense white papers. They 
mandate that the government can use force for self-defense only when:
• there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; 
• there are no other means of stopping that aggression; and 
• the use of armed force is confined to the minimum necessary level.9
While the principles taken together are sufficient to prohibit collective 
self-defense, the CLB augmented its earlier testimony in 1955. Article 13 
of the constitution states that the right of the Japanese people to life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness is the government’s highest consideration. 
According to the CLB, this implied an official “obligation to protect public 
order and freedom,” which would be impaired in a direct attack on Japan. 
Japan could thus defend itself, but, due to the restrictions in Article 9, only 
insofar as it would be protecting the Japanese people’s rights. Thus, “Article 
9 considered in conjunction with Article 13, naturally recognizes […] ac-
tion necessarily limited to eliminating a direct invasion.”10 If that was not 
clear enough, the CLB stated in 1960 that the right to defend a friendly 
foreign nation under attack “while called the right of collective self-defense 
[in international law], is not recognized under the constitution.”11 
The Supreme Court, which officially holds the power to “determine the 
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act” issued a ruling 
in the 1959 Sunagawa case, that, while not concurring outright with the 
CLB interpretation, did reiterate and reinforce some of its major tenets. The 
central question in the case was whether U.S. bases and forces on Japanese 
soil constituted the illegal maintenance by the Japanese government of “war 
potential.” The court ruled that they did not, because the government did 
not exercise command over them. Moreover, the court held that the re-
nunciation of war and use of force in paragraph one of Article 9 did not 
constitute rejection of Japan’s right to self-defense, and so foreign forces 
could be stationed in Japan according to that right. However, that right was 
to be exercised by Japan taking only “measures for necessary self-defense in 
order to fulfill the existence and maintain the peace and safety of its own 
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nation ( jikoku).” 12 The clear implication of this ruling was “that actions or 
arrangements that were not strictly for the defense of Japan, and military 
forces or other war potential that were under the command of the Japanese 
government” might violate Article 9.13
 More notoriously, the court also declared its reluctance to rule on trea-
ties and laws concerning national security, because, unless their content was 
clearly unconstitutional, they stood as “political questions” best left to the 
Diet.14 This was an amazing abdication of the court’s formal powers, but 
along with the subsequent development of narrow standing rules that made 
it difficult for anyone to bring a case against the government for violation of 
Article 9, it had the effect of increasing the importance of CLB interpreta-
tions. In the absence of Supreme Court rulings, it was the CLB that would 
determine how the constitution applied to security—and for that matter, 
most other—legislation.
Indeed, the CLB confirmed its interpretation on collective self-defense in 
Diet debates on the issue in 1973. The interpretation also served as the basis 
for an official 1981 declaration outlining the government’s view that Japan 
had the right of collective self-defense under international law, but “the ex-
ercise of the right of self-defense must stay within the minimum necessary 
level to defend Japan (wagakuni), and collective self-defense exceeds this 
limit and is therefore impermissible under the constitution.”15 By the early 
1980s the ban on collective self-defense was considered such an essential 
part of Japan’s constitutional fabric that the CLB director-general and sev-
eral ministers (including Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, the current prime 
minister’s father) unequivocally testified that future governments wanting 
to reverse the ban “would naturally have to do so by means of constitutional 
revision.”16 Successive governments have reiterated this testimony.
PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMISSION’S ARGUMENTS 
Indeed, such testimony corresponds to accepted theory on constitutional 
change. The major problem with the approach of the commission recon-
vened by Shinzo Abe is that, like its earlier attempt, it seeks to justify 
reinterpretation primarily with reference to Japan’s practical needs in its 
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transforming regional security environment.17 But constitutions by their 
very nature establish prior commitments to restrict government action 
even—and arguably especially—when political and practical circum-
stances change. Certainly, the interpretation of constitutional texts can 
transform over time, but this process must be incremental and usually 
emerges as the result of evolving judicial interpretation of constitutional 
law principles in the context of specific cases. While there is substantial 
debate about the legitimacy of such a process, no widely accepted consti-
tutional theory contemplates conscious, “ad hoc, [and] radical govern-
ment reinterpretation of provisions to fit perceived policy needs.”18
 Be that as it may, the commission will likely revert to its previous argu-
ments that Japan needs to be able to engage in collective self-defense in 
order to meet its treaty commitments to the United States and the United 
Nations. Indeed, commission members are clear that greater bilateral and 
international cooperation is the main reason behind their preference for 
reinterpretation.19 Yet, obligations under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
or United Nations Charter also cannot be used as legitimate grounds to 
change current interpretations of Article 9. Article 98 of the constitution 
does oblige Japan to observe its treaty obligations, but this does not mean 
it would place any such obligations above its constitutional provisions. In 
any case, the security treaty does not purport to impose such obligations, 
clearly stating that during an attack, each party is obliged only to “act to 
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions 
and processes.” If a case on the principles of the constitution itself cannot 
be found for exercising the right of collective self-defense, the treaty does 
not provide one.
The commission does, however, have another argument that it claims 
is conceptually derived from constitutional doctrine. This argument turns 
on the principle that Japan is only permitted the use of force as long as it 
stays within the minimum necessary level for defense. “Minimum” here 
has long been understood as a relative term, whose meaning changes ac-
cording to other nations’ capabilities. In general, Japan refrains from arm-
ing itself with such weapons as long-range bombers and intercontinental 
ballistic missiles, primarily used for attacks far beyond a nation’s borders. 
Nevertheless, it can adjust the composition and armaments of its forces 
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to meet clearly defined threats to its territory. Commission members have 
therefore argued that the right of collective self-defense should be included 
in this minimum necessary level.20 The commission also later revealed that 
it thought Japan should be able to respond militarily to attacks on friendly 
countries in “cases which, if neglected, would have a large influence on 
Japan’s security.”21
Though more sophisticated than previous legal arguments for exercis-
ing the right of collective self-defense, the commission’s new position is 
still problematic, both in terms of the objections to reinterpretation raised 
above, and on its own merits. First, the hypothetical “large influence on 
Japan’s security” that serves as the condition for military action is too vague 
and expands Article 9 well beyond its intended scope. Early debates on the 
constitution show that Japanese lawmakers who reviewed and revised the 
document before it was promulgated were clear that the article’s inclusion 
in the main text rather than the preamble meant that it placed real legal 
restrictions on the government.22 Yet, the commission’s reinterpretation 
would provide the government with broad and arbitrary powers to declare 
a particular situation a “large influence on Japanese security,” and thus not 
an “international dispute.” Restrictions on these powers would be mostly 
political,23 and independent of clear-cut criteria, such as the current stipula-
tion that Japan’s sovereign territorial rights be subject to actual or imminent 
violation for Japan to defend itself. The reinterpretation would therefore 
strip Article 9 of its legal force. This is perhaps the Abe government’s objec-
tive, but it is also clearly unconstitutional. 
Second, the logical flaws in the commission’s approach are quite serious. 
The requirement that the use of force be restricted to the minimum neces-
sary level was but one of three principles derived together from a reading 
of Article 9. To make any sense as an interpretation of the text itself, they 
are therefore inseparable and include the condition that there must be an 
“illegitimate and imminent” act of aggression “against Japan.” As well as 
explicitly ruling out collective self-defense for Japan, the government’s 1981 
declaration, derived from those principles, limits the minimum necessary 
use of force to that needed “to defend Japan (wagakuni).” Because all three 
principles form a comprehensive interpretation, then, the commission can-
not simply isolate the “minimum necessary level” principle from the other 
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two, or indeed from Article 9 itself, and use it as a basis for reinterpretation. 
To have any credibility at all, it must offer a new explanation for how its 
interpretation fits with the text of the constitution. It does not seem intent 
on providing one.
LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
REINTERPRETATION 
There are, then, significant unanswered questions about the commission’s 
findings, and opinion leaders in Japan are now warning the prime minister 
to respect the rule of law and the integrity of the constitution as he pro-
ceeds.24 Moreover, collective self-defense is, along with security and secrecy 
laws recently railroaded through the Diet, part of a package of unpopular 
government actions that strike at the heart of Japan’s post-war antimilitarist 
national identity. Only about a third of Japanese polled think that exercis-
ing the right of collective self-defense should be allowed, while over 50 per-
cent, including a majority of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) 
supporters, oppose it.25
Abe’s push for reinterpretation may therefore strengthen opposition and 
impair his ability to achieve his long-term goals, especially around consti-
tutional revision. In addition to a two-thirds majority vote in both houses 
of the Diet, any revision to the text of the constitution needs the support of 
a majority of voters in a national referendum. Public support for revision is 
therefore crucial, and the role of civil society is particularly important here. 
After Japan’s participation in the Iraq War, thousands of protest groups, 
coordinated from 2004 by a central “Article 9 Association” acted to reverse 
trends in public opinion, which until then increasingly favored constitu-
tional revision in general and was even creeping toward an endorsement of 
changing Article 9. While these groups have since been out of the public 
eye, opposition to Abe’s approach is likely to reinvigorate them. Moreover, 
there is significant scope for confluence with protestors of the government’s 
pro-nuclear policy and its secrecy and security legislation, meaning that 
public opposition to constitutional revision may have more staying power as 
the result of a “growing and changing civil society.”26 
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Reinterpretation may also have important long term consequences in 
the Diet. Key here is the role of Komeito, the smaller party in the LDP-led 
coalition government. Komeito, is backed by the Buddhist organization 
Soka Gakkai, which maintains a strong commitment to the pacifist prin-
ciples of the constitution.27 Leader Natsuo Yamaguchi has declared that 
he is “absolutely opposed” to reinterpretation.28 Nevertheless, Komeito 
has endorsed measures contrary to the pacifist views of its constituents 
before, such as SDF participation in the Iraq War. It has justified its po-
sition in the LDP-led government as providing a check on the excesses 
of its larger partner, and may agree to reinterpretation with significant 
conditions. Given that Abe may not want to cut Komeito adrift because 
of its ability to organize voters for the LDP in districts that it does not 
contest, the smaller party may well be able to slow down the process of 
legislating under any reinterpretation, insisting that it scrutinize bills en-
abling SDF action and that restrictions be applied before they are passed. 
Indeed, Abe may even postpone his announcement of reinterpretation to 
satisfy Komeito.
If Komeito cannot cut a deal with the LDP, however, it might leave, 
or be ejected from, the ruling coalition over the issue of collective self-de-
fense. In this case, in order to ensure its bills pass the upper house, the LDP 
would need to join forces with either the right-wing Your Party or the Japan 
Restoration Party (JRP) or, more likely, both. Indeed, Abe has labelled the 
two “the responsible opposition parties” and JRP officials are speculating 
over the possibility and shape of a new coalition.29 
Such a coalition would complicate both U.S. and Japanese diplomacy 
in the region. The JRP in particular is a collection of some of Japan’s 
more bombastic nationalist politicians. Abe is already under fire in the 
overseas media for his recent visit to the controversial Yasukuni shrine, 
and for the outrageous comments of strident nationalists he hand-picked 
to serve on the board of the national broadcaster. Regional and inter-
national criticism of his well-known views of history will only intensify 
if the LDP forms a coalition with the JRP over reinterpretation. Such a 
coalition would serve to reconfirm fears within the minds of Chinese and 
Korean policymakers that collective self-defense is part of Abe’s broader 
agenda for a forthright and nationalistic Japan. This will frustrate U.S. 
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 efforts to convince partners in Seoul to work more closely with Japan, 
and it will cause problems for relations between Washington and Beijing, 
given Japan’s status as a U.S. ally.
Abe’s approach to the constitution also devalues the rhetorical power of 
his own diplomacy. In criticism of China’s vast maritime territorial claims, 
including over territory Japan sees as its own, Abe has stressed that countries 
in the region must adhere to the rule of international maritime law. Such 
a policy should be applauded. However, his attachment to the rule of law 
overseas notwithstanding, the prime minister has declared during Diet de-
bates on reinterpretation that he views the notion of constitutional restric-
tions on government action as old-fashioned and that he alone is ultimately 
responsible for reinterpreting the constitution on behalf of the government. 
Abe’s comments attracted immediate rebuke from lawyers, the media, and 
opposition parties for being ignorant of the basic tenets of constitutional-
ism.30 His calls for the rule of law in the international sphere when he seems 
not to respect it at home will therefore ring hollow.31
Indeed, there is also the admittedly slight possibility of legal action com-
plicating Abe’s reinterpretation agenda. As in the past, citizens groups will 
no doubt bring court cases against the government. The courts have ulti-
mately rejected such cases on failure to meet extremely narrow criteria for 
standing. Nevertheless, cases are often filed as a type of protest activity “to 
keep the action before the public” and therefore to prolong litigation even 
when there is no chance of winning.32 In 2008, for example, the Nagoya 
High Court dismissed, on standing, a case against SDF dispatch in Iraq, 
but nevertheless noted in its non-binding commentary that Air Self Defense 
Force missions transporting foreign soldiers and supplies to combat areas 
“play[ed] a part in the use of force by other countries” and thus were in 
violation of the constitution.33 The LDP poured scorn on the ruling, but it 
was of political benefit to the opposition Democratic Party of Japan, which 
viewed the dispatch as unconstitutional.34 The rulings of even rejected cases 
are thus sometimes embarrassing for the government.
What is more serious is that the Supreme Court may choose to examine 
a case on the constitutionality of collective self-defense. Such a case would 
have deleterious effects on any concurrent missions involving collective 
self-defense activities, because the government would have to act cautiously 
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while the legal basis of those activities was under review. The case might 
also result in a constitutional crisis where the court strikes down important 
security legislation and the government resists the ruling. More likely, it 
could further devalue the power of the court as a guardian of the constitu-
tion if the court reaffirmed its subordinate status on “political issues,” or 
reviewed the case and rejected it on narrow standing rules. None of this 
would be a good outcome for Japanese democracy.
The chance that such a case will reach the Supreme Court is slim, but 
it is not zero. The court has been extremely reluctant to invalidate laws on 
constitutional grounds. One reason for this, however, is that government 
bills are usually carefully scrutinized by several skilled legal experts at the 
CLB before they reach the Diet, and thus there is “very little chance that 
any new legislation contravening the Constitution […] would see the light 
of day.”35 By appointing its own external commission, as well as an outsider 
as CLB director, to expedite the reinterpretation process, however, the Abe 
government has upended this careful process of prior review. Unlike the 
commission, moreover, the court cannot emphasize practical matters in its 
judgments, and must focus on application of the law. Indeed, Tsuneyuki 
Yamamoto, the most recent justice appointed to the court has announced 
publically that collective self-defense would be “extremely difficult” to 
square with the constitution, and that it could only be realized through 
revision.36 If Yamamoto’s opinion is shared by other justices, the prime 
minister cannot completely assume the acquiescence of the court that his 
predecessors have generally enjoyed.
MAKING AMENDS
Is Japan’s ban on collective self-defense outdated? Perhaps. But the correct 
way to rescind the ban is to build a consensus across parties and the public 
and to revise the text of the constitution through its own amendment pro-
cedures. By stirring up public opinion, placing his coalition partner into a 
political dilemma while pandering to alternative parties, and inviting con-
tentious legal challenges to his agenda, the prime minister is setting back 
the cause of constitutional revision. This is unfortunate for Abe. Not only is 
54
Abe’s Law: Domestic Dimensions of Japan’s Collective Self-Defense Debate
revision one of the prime minister’s ultimate goals, it is the only avenue of 
constitutional change whose legitimacy cannot be questioned. 
During the Cold War, ideological opposition from left-wing parties in 
the Diet made constitutional revision all but impossible. Since the late-
1990s, however, moderate opposition parties have been more open to revi-
sion. The LDP has been in power most of that time, yet it has never initi-
ated serious cross-party dialogue aimed at updating the basic law in ways 
that were broadly acceptable. Abe, with his commanding majority in the 
Diet, could magnanimously invite the disorganized opposition to discuss 
change. Experience in similar political systems shows that consensus will 
almost certainly be required for serious constitutional revision, and Abe 
should understand this.37 Instead, his party has intentionally and divisively 
publicized an ideological draft constitution that would erode many of the 
current constitution’s popular principles of pacifism, the Japanese people’s 
rights, and democracy. The LDP’s draft, moreover, is flawed as a consti-
tutional document, because it effectively removes all restrictions on state 
power vis-à-vis the individual.38 
This is no way to go about constitutional revision, and reinterpretation 
of the type that Abe is proposing is not legitimate. It is now the LDP that is 
being ideological and irresponsible in its approach to constitutional change. 
American analysts and policymakers, when they gently push Japan’s leaders 
to reinterpret the constitution and exercise the right of collective self-de-
fense, almost always state that this must also be the decision of the Japanese 
people.39 Yet Abe’s vision for reinterpretation would introduce radical 
change in a way tailored specifically to avoid the messy but legitimate dem-
ocratic debate needed for revision. Liberal newspaper editorials in Japan, 
and even leading figures within his own party, are currently urging Abe 
to slow down the reinterpretation process so that it can receive democratic 
scrutiny.40 The correct approach, however, would be to stop it altogether. 
Perhaps then, the government could embark on the legitimate process of 
building consensus for moderate constitutional revision.
The author would like to thank Akihiko Kimijima and Craig Martin for their 
comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
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Policy Recommendations
Reinterpretation of the constitution to allow Japan to exercise the 
right of collective self-defense is controversial in Japan. Polls show 
that only a third of the Japanese population supports it, while be-
tween 50 and 60 percent oppose it. Opposition is partly due to 
Abe’s approach. A commission of experts he set up to examine the 
issue has been criticized as specially selected to push for reinter-
pretation, while his choice for director of the Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau (CLB) has upset convention.
 ● Abe’s approach may stir up public sentiment and set back his 
agenda for outright revision of the text of the constitution. It 
may reinvigorate citizens networks set up to protect Article 9, 
the “peace” clause of the Japanese constitution.
 ● Komeito, the smaller party in Abe’s coalition government 
opposes constitutional revision to allow Japan to exercise the 
right of collective self-defense and will move to complicate any 
attempt to implement it quickly or without restrictions. 
 ● Abe could rely on nationalist parties instead. This would 
complicate regional diplomacy, given Korean and Chinese and, 
increasingly, U.S. views on historical revisionism in Japan.
 ● Court cases will be used to protest reinterpretation. While unlikely, 
the Supreme Court may also take up a case on the constitutionality 
of laws passed under any government reinterpretation. In the 
past, the court has been reluctant to engage in judicial review of 
legislation, but that may change with the government upending 
the CLB’s careful process of prior review.
 ● Revision through the amendment procedures of the constitution 
is the only legitimate method of constitutional change. Abe 
should understand that this requires consensus, stop his divisive 
approach to the constitution, and work towards the goal of 
moderate revision.
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